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Abstract
Over the past decades commercial and academic market(ing) researchers
have studied consumers through a range of different methods including
surveys, focus groups, or interviews. More recently, some have turned to
the growing field of neuroscience to understand consumers. Neuro-
marketing employs brain imaging, scanning, or other brain measurement
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technologies to capture consumers’ (brain) responses to marketing stimuli
and to circumvent the “problem” of relying on consumers’ self-reports.
This paper presents findings of an ethnographic study of neuromarketing
research practices in one neuromarketing consultancy. Our access to the
minutiae of commercial neuromarketing research provides important
insights into how neuromarketers silence the neuromarketing test subject
in their experiments and presentations and how they introduce the brain as
an unimpeachable witness. This enables us conceptually to reconsider the
role of witnesses in the achievement of scientific credibility, as prominently
discussed in science and technology studies (STS). Specifically, we probe the
role witnesses and silences play in establishing and maintaining credibility in
and for “commercial research laboratories.” We propose three themes
that have wider relevance for STS researchers and require further attention
when studying newly emerging research fields and practices that straddle
science and its commercial application.
Keywords
markets/economies, academic disciplines and traditions, methodologies,
methods, witness, neuroscience, neuromarketing
Introduction
Why do consumers buy what they buy? This question is central for any
marketing and advertising professional and has spurred the development of
an industry of its own: market research. Traditionally, market research
relies on data elicited from consumers employing a diverse set of methods
including questionnaires, focus groups, and interviews. This paper presents
findings of an ethnographic study of a new practice and field of market
research, so-called neuromarketing. Neuromarketing employs brain ima-
ging, and other brain activity measurement technology, as well as biometric
methods to capture consumers’ (brain) responses to marketing stimuli.
Interest in the application of neuroscience to marketing mirrors the
growing attention to the brain over the past two decades (Rose and
Abi-Rached 2013). Since President Bush formally designated the period
1990–2000 “the decade of the brain,” the number of articles on the topic of
neuroscience increased, according to Web of Knowledge, from 44 articles
in 1990, to 600 in 2000, to 3,236 in 2016 (see http://www.loc.gov/loc/brain/
proclaim.html; www.webofknowledge.com, accessed October 2017).
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These articles derive from various fields, including disciplines such as
philosophy, history, religion studies, and economics, which are traditionally
unrelated to the neurosciences. To find out how this integration of neu-
roscience in other fields works out in practice, we studied one of these new
neurofields. Neuromarketing is a growing field in academia (there mainly
called “consumer neuroscience”) and in the commercial world. The term
neuromarketing and the first companies appeared around 2000 and since
then the field expanded steadily (Plassmann, Ramsøy, and Milosavljevic
2012). In 2012, the field was established with its own industry association—
the Neuromarketing Science and Business Association (NMSBA)—which
has 1,684 members from 139 companies, in 93 countries, at the moment of
writing (see http://www.nmsba.com/countries/, accessed October 2017).
In this paper, we focus on the practices of one specific neuromarketing
consultancy, which we refer to as Neuro-X, offering functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) research for commercial market research. Our
article is structured as follows. First, we introduce our ethnographic
approach to studying neuromarketing practices in general and Neuro-X in
particular. Our access to the minutiae of commercial neuromarketing
research provides in-depth insights into how neuromarketers silence the
neuromarketing subject (i.e., consumer or test subject) in their experiments
and presentations and how they introduce the brain as an unimpeachable
witness. This enables us conceptually to reconsider the role of witnesses in
the achievement of scientific credibility, as prominently discussed in sci-
ence and technology studies (STS; e.g., Shapin 1984). Next, we consider the
role secrets and silences play in neuromarketing to rethink the notion of
witnesses in STS. We demonstrate that not only do direct and virtual wit-
nesses play an important role in producing credibility in neuromarketing
research, but that secrets and silences can also have important performative
effects. Ultimately, we argue that silence and secrecy should not be con-
sidered merely as an absence of witnesses in STS. Our study demonstrates
that silence can help produce credibility when it allows virtual witnesses to
speak on behalf of direct witnesses. We conclude with a discussion of the
wider relevance of our study for STS and more broadly for researchers
studying newly emerging research fields and practices that span science
and its commercial application.
An Ethnography of Neuro-X
In our research, we consider the emergence and development of neuromar-
keting through a multisited ethnographic research and interview study in
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commercial and academic settings involved in neuromarketing. The aim of
our study is to explore the role of neuroscientific knowledge, technologies,
and practices in the production of authoritative knowledge about consumers
and markets. We are specifically interested in the growing prominence of
the brain in the context of market research. In our ethnographic research, we
have encountered a diverse range of neuromarketing practices in commer-
cial and academic neuromarketing settings including not only the use of
neuroscientific technologies such as fMRI and electroencephalography but
also the use of so-called biometrics such as eye tracking, facial coding, and
heart rate monitoring. Despite the diversity of neuromarketing practices and
technologies, members of the laboratories and companies we visited share a
relatively consistent understanding of consumers as not having access to
their true motives. This conceptualization of consumers is also present in
academic publications, professional marketing literature, and media
accounts of neuromarketing (Schneider and Woolgar 2012). As some of
us have argued elsewhere, this description allows marketers to bypass con-
sumers’ accounts and claim to reveal the hidden causes of consumer beha-
vior using neuromarketing (Schneider and Woolgar 2012).
Between 2011 and 2015, we conducted twenty-one semistructured inter-
views with people (from Europe or the United States) working for neuro-
marketing companies, conducting academic research in consumer
neuroscience, or who were involved in other activities in this field (e.g.,
writing books, organizing events). The interviews and observations gener-
ally took place in the working areas of the interviewees (e.g., scanning
centers, companies, universities, conference sites). We observed or partici-
pated in seven neuromarketing experiments and had five meetings in which
the analysis of the fMRI data or the setup of the experiments was explained.
We participated in three courses and three conferences on neuromarketing/
consumer neuroscience, and we attended six lectures of neuromarketing
companies for a broader audience and/or clients. In addition, we had the
opportunity to accompany one neuromarketing consultant to a presentation
of the consultancy’s services to members of the marketing department of an
international consumer goods company. We also collected and analyzed
articles in newspapers, magazines, and journals and a neuromarketing year-
book (NMSBA 2013).
Following established qualitative data analysis procedures (Miles,
Huberman, and Saldana 2014), we analyzed our material (transcripts, field
notes, relevant documents) with the computer program Atlas.ti (version 7),
which resulted in 180 codes that we clustered into seventeen topics.1 This
gave input for two main themes: “control and subjectivity” and “inside the
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algorithm: silence and secrecy” as well as a “rest” category. Corporate
secrecy was a main barrier to our attempts at insights into procedures and
tools of data analysis in the neuromarketing studies we observed, so we
started to wonder how this lack of openness about data analysis (which was
also observed on the part of clients, academic researchers, competitors) is
related to neuromarketing’s credibility—especially since neuroimaging
techniques gain their credibility from the idea of visibility (Baker et al.
2017; Beaulieu 2002).
This paper focuses on a subset of our collected material with the aim to
report about the laboratory practices at one specific site—a neuromarketing
consultancy we shall refer to as Neuro-X. Since the topic of secrecy spon-
taneously emerged in most of our material, and since about one-third of our
material concerned or was related to Neuro-X (e.g., by mentioning the
company), we argue that our ethnographic study of Neuro-X’s research
practices provides unique insights into the process of producing knowledge
about consumers and their brains using fMRI. That is, we see our case study
as an illustrative example of how neuromarketers manage the gap between
neuroscience and marketing.
To preserve the anonymity of Neuro-X, we have taken several measures.
First, we use a pseudonym for the company and all its members. We have
assigned female gender (she) to all persons mentioned in this article, which
may or may not reflect the gender of the interviewed/observed person. We
also focus exclusively on one neuroscientific method among the different
methods that the consultancy employs to prevent identification by the spec-
trum and combination of methods employed.
Neuro-X is a neuromarketing company in Europe with clients all over
the world. In contrast to some other consultancies that preferred to keep
their doors closed to external researchers, Neuro-X was very welcoming
and allowed us to conduct interviews with five company members, observe
during two experiments, and attend four lectures in which the company
promoted their research to potential clients or marketing students. We focus
on their use of fMRI research. They, for example, test consumers’ brain
activity regarding commercials, package designs, or logos, and sometimes,
they design and conduct fMRI experiments to answer specific questions of
clients (i.e., retail or other companies). Simply explained, such an experi-
ment is designed as follows: a participant is prepared for the fMRI scanner
(metal objects removed, body postured with pillows, technology installed),
in which he or she views pictures that are supposed to evoke emotional
responses (e.g., a spider evokes fear), and the corresponding brain responses
are registered under these emotions. Next (or before), the participant is
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shown packages, commercials, or other relevant stimuli, and his or her brain
reactions are measured and compared with those evoked by the emotional
stimuli and related to some benchmarks the company has identified (e.g.,
for effective commercials) based on prior research. The experiment is nor-
mally performed with twenty-four subjects, and often multiple materials
(e.g., packages) from multiple clients are tested in one experiment. Clients
receive the results of their tested products in the form of scores on emotions,
and in this way, they can see that their package design, for example, evokes
too much fear in comparison to the company’s benchmark for efficacy.
From Traditional Market Research to Neuromarketing:
Silence the Subject and Enact the Brain
In neuromarketing presentations, books, websites, and interviews, the use of
neuroscientific methods is regularly justified with statements that highlight
the ambiguous nature of consumers’ accounts. A marketer of Neuro-X, for
instance, replicates in lectures and interviews: “Now, we know that what
people say is not what they mean” (N2).2 “Apparently, we just cannot or
don’t want enough—one of the two—that is, we are not reliable enough”
(C5) explains a PhD student in consumer neuroscience. And a professor of
neuroscience, working for Neuro-X, claims: “You should never ask people
about their intentions. ( . . . ) for a long time we know that this hardly says
anything about what happens in the market” (N1).
However, historical marketing research demonstrates that this
“problem” has actually been the drive of biometrical research in marketing
since the start of the twentieth century (Schwarzkopf 2015) and that debates
on whether market research should ask consumers directly or indirectly
about their motives have existed throughout this period (Henry 1971 as
cited in Schwarzkopf 2010). The only new thing about neuromarketing,
one could argue, is the claim that it is neuroscience that will reveal
the “true motives,” the “real intentions,” or the “inner” or “essential” truth
of the “naked,” “unconscious,” or “intuitive” consumer (e.g., Genco, Pohl-
mann, and Steidl 2013; Larson 1994). That is, on the basis of the deep-
rooted claim that the voice of the consumer is unreliable, his or her physical
brain response is now used as a form of lie detection. As one neuromarketer
quoted in a media article put it: “They tell you ‘I’m not interested in that’
but their medial prefrontal cortex is saying they are” (Blakeslee 2004). And
comparable to how brain activity is used as a lie detection, the brain scanner
becomes a detector that reveals the real truth about you because it “knows
better” (N1) and can predict your behavior (see also Balmer 2015;
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Littlefield 2011). As the professor of neuroscience, working for Neuro-
X, put it:
You can ask people [something], and they will obediently answer, but it
won’t say anything about what they do in the shop. Not because people are
lying, or because their answers are socially acceptable, ( . . . ) the most impor-
tant reason is: you cannot look into your own brain—and we can. We can
look into your brain. That is why a brain scanner knows better what you want,
than you do. (N1)
That is, the scanner is introduced as an actor that acts on an indisputable
witness—the brain. Moreover, with the help of a scanner, one single brain
“speaks” for multiple silenced subjects:
When you ask 1,000 people about their opinion, you get 999 [different] answers.
Whenyou ask 30 brains about their opinion, this says something about all people
that are more or less like them. Our brains do not differ so much. (N1)
This shows that neuromarketing research not only enacts the brain as a more
reliable witness than the subject but also presents this witness as speaking
for a much larger group of subjects. In the next section, we go more deeply
into this idea of witnesses in science, to understand what roles they perform
in neuromarketing practices. In addition, we will demonstrate that neuro-
marketers not only produce witnesses but also have to orchestrate silences
in order to achieve a witnessing public.
Changing Witnesses
In her book The Invention of Modern Science, Stengers (2000) gives a clear
example of the power of witnesses in science. She writes:
whoever doubts the existence of the Sun would have stacked against him or
her not only the witness of astronomers and our everyday experience, but also
the witness of our retinas, invented to detect light, and the chlorophyll of
plants, invented to capture its energy. By contrast, it is perfectly possible to
doubt the existence of the “big bang,” for what bears witness to it are only
certain indices that have meaning only for a very particular and homogeneous
class of scientific specialists. (p. 97)
Elaborating on Stengers’s ideas, Ashmore, Brown, and MacMillan (2005)
use the notion of witness to analyze demarcation and demonstration
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techniques in social and clinical psychology. They show that social psy-
chologists produce many reliable witnesses in the form of experimental
outcomes, publications, representative scientists, and claims that most peo-
ple recognize, while clinical psychologists have to work with personal
experiences of patients that might be turned into (countable) case studies
at the most but will never be recognized by a general public. Hence, clinical
psychologists are faced with a greater challenge to demonstrate their exper-
tise than social psychologists.
For Stengers and Ashmore et al., witnesses are mainly representatives of
a certain phenomenon: astronomers, retinas and chlorophyll, and experi-
mental outcomes, important scientists, and claims everyone recognizes all
help us to believe in the sun or psychological phenomena. Returning to
Shapin’s (1984) study of the experimental program of natural philosopher
Robert Boyle, however, introduces another type of witness. According to
Boyle, matters of fact are generated by a multiplication of eyewitnesses. An
experience, or experimental performance, witnessed by only one person is
not a matter of fact, but when the witness could be multiplied to many, a
result could be constituted as an indisputable matter of fact. Reflecting on
this, Shapin introduced the notion of “virtual witnesses.” Not only should
direct observers of an event be seen as witnesses, people who read about the
procedures and results of an experiment, and hence make an image of the
event in their own mind, can also be understood as witnesses. In this way,
the multiplication of witnesses enlarges the “witnessing public” (Shapin
1984). This is further elaborated in Shapin and Schaffer’s (1985) book
Leviathan and the Air Pump where the authors explain how Boyle advo-
cated a set of communication protocols that define adequate scientific
reporting. This “literary technology” allows those who are not present
during the experiment to become “virtual witnesses” and makes the require-
ment for direct witnessing or replication less important.
Many more scholars in the field of STS elaborated on the role of (virtual)
witnesses, and in these reflections, different kinds of actors such as articles,
manuals, photographs, diagrams, and so on came to be understood as vehi-
cles or “immutable mobiles” (phenomena such as maps or books that are
moveable but have a stable function and form) that produce virtual wit-
nesses or that function as witnesses themselves (see, e.g., Latour 1987;
Latour and Woolgar 1979). In a review of some of these accounts, Woolgar
and Coopmans (2006) use the case of “grid technologies” (technological
systems for the development of cyberinfrastructures or e-science) to
demonstrate that not only is there a distinction between direct witnesses
(e.g., direct observers) and virtual witnesses (e.g., readers of the published
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experiment) of an actual experiment, but also a distinction between what is
often understood as actual (real) information (e.g., raw data) and virtual
information (e.g., a graph/conclusion/explanation). That is, apparently, wit-
nesses can move in multiple directions: from “actual experiment” to “direct
witness” and from “virtual information” to “virtual witness.” Moreover,
witnesses can also have multiple roles: while Stengers and Ashmore et al.
introduced witnesses as actors proclaiming evidence (making facts), Shapin
and Schaffer presented witnesses as a more passive public (acknowledging
facts).
Taking these diverse roles and directions of witnesses into account puts
neuromarketing in a slightly different light. To narrow the field of market-
ing to neuromarketing, the direct witnesses have to change (e.g., from test
subjects to brains or marketers to neuroscientists). Furthermore, what is
understood as actual information (e.g., responses on questionnaires vs. raw
brain data), virtual information (e.g., graphs vs. brain images), and tech-
nologies (e.g., questionnaires vs. brain scanners) have to change as well.
However, by presenting the brain as a witness that substitutes for thousands
of consumer voices, neuromarketers also seem to lose a group of witnesses.
After all, many people can follow arguments based upon data derived from
questionnaires or focus groups, but it is much more complicated to under-
stand how experts extract consumer insights from the brain. That is, the
development from marketing to neuromarketing appears to result in a
reduction of the number of direct and virtual witnesses. Neuromarketing
is evidenced with fewer participants, the methods and results are understood
by fewer people, and the knowledge is less recognizable. This raises the
question of how neuromarketers produce credibility for their claims.
To find out how this gap between (neuro)science and its applications is
managed by neuromarketers, we studied the activities and strategies of
Neuro-X. We demonstrate that neuromarketers have to be “savvy
strategists” (Woolgar and Coopmans 2006, 19) who carefully orchestrate
their witnesses by making some of them silent and giving others a voice.
Rather than considering this secrecy as a barrier to understanding neuro-
marketing in the making, we follow Rappert’s (2010) suggestion and con-
sider “the potential for the absent.” Based on his research on diplomatic and
security communities, Rappert asks “how the highlighting of secrets and
absences could be part of efforts to do justice to our understanding of social
life” (p. 571). Following his advice on highlighting secrets, we examine in
our account the performative effects of secrets.
In this article, we show how neuromarketing relies on witnesses that are
not fully open or understood, on clients who are only visible if they can
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benefit, and on methods that can never be verified. We will demonstrate that
secrets and silences can conceal the information of the actual experiment
and let virtual witnesses speak on behalf of the direct witnesses. In this way,
we conclude silence and secrecy can produce virtual information that is no
longer based upon the actual experiment but on meeting (or exceeding)
clients’ expectations, for instance, in terms of increased sales or market
share.
In the Name of Neuroscience
Neuromarketing companies frequently rely on the idea that emotions can be
measured in the brain. However, in our interviews and observations with
neuroscientists doing fMRI analyses, this idea was substituted with rather
complex explanations about magnetic molecules, statistical tests, computer
software programs (C4), and “construct definitions from the outside world”
(N3). We found this complex, and so did the neuroscientists (“I hardly
understand this myself” (C4); “this is a very complex question” (N3; see
also Beaulieu 2001; Cohn 2008). To prevent that all witnesses of neuro-
marketing disappear in this gap of complexity, many companies have one
department for the complex work of data analysis and a separate one to
explain the results to clients in comprehensible language.
Similarly, in Neuro-X, the tasks and responsibilities are clearly distrib-
uted among different members. The company consists of marketers who
explain the neuropart to potential clients, researchers who transform retail
questions into experimental designs, fMRI experiment operatives who pre-
pare the participants and make sure they cooperate, and analysts who trans-
form the raw brain data into statistics and into networks that represent
emotional or cognitive states. The researchers and marketers then go back
to the client to explain the emotion networks and transform it into practical
business strategies. All these parties—marketers, researchers, experiment
operatives, and analysts—are each accountable for just a small part of the
overall study.
The marketing story is simple and straightforward. Although ideas about
buy buttons in brains, manipulation of behavior, and predicting effective-
ness are critically discussed in and outside the field of neuromarketing and
consumer neuroscience (e.g., Kenning 2008), one of the key scientists of
Neuro-X makes statements in the media like:
Neuromarketing is about pushing the right buttons in the brain of a consumer.
( . . . ) [With neuromarketing tools] it is possible to understand, predict and
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hence to manipulate behaviour. ( . . . ) With neuromarketing you know exactly
beforehand what is effective and what is not effective. (N1)3
Besides her work for the neuromarketing company, this scientist is a
professor of neuroscience at a top university, and she is nationally known
for her lectures, popular scientific books, and newspaper articles on the
brain. With her reputation and clear statements, she figures as an expert
spokesperson for Neuro-X. In the words of one of our interviewees, a
professor of consumer neuroscience, who regularly mentions Neuro-X
in her lectures:
[This scientist] visits the management offices. So the whole concept is sold with
the idea: “we have a top professor in neuroscience who knows how the brain
works ( . . . ).” She tells her story and someone else will bring the results. (C1)
Neuro-X is not the only company that mobilizes prominent scientists as
expert representatives. Other neuroscientists we interviewed said they
would also like to have a top scientist involved in their company. As
Ashmore, Brown, and MacMillan (2005) have pointed out, for example,
in discussing the role of Elizabeth Loftus as an “expert witness” in the
memory wars, distinguished scientists can function as witnesses who justify
a claim, or defend a phenomenon, and distribute it via the media to a wider
(witnessing) public. That is, having a well-known neuroscientist on board
helps to attain scientific credibility for your company.
The “top” scientist of Neuro-X acts as an expert representative of the
consultancy in the media, and perhaps she also visits some management
offices to convince potential clients. Another member of Neuro-X, working
in the company’s marketing and sales team, delivers most of the lectures for
marketers, students, and potential clients. In a lecture at a retail conference,
she explains:
Effectiveness [e.g., of a commercial] is being based on positive emotions
being higher levels than negative emotions [ . . . ]. [Some positive] emotions
[are] evoked when you want to buy something, and obviously negative emo-
tions must be off. (N2)
When questioned about the use of fMRI in above traditional methods, she
answers: “I think the advantage of neuromarketing in general and fMRI in
specific is to avoid human mistakes.” And to assure the credibility for this
fMRI method, she adds: “fMRI has to be done by hard-core scientists. They
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use internationally published facts that are already discovered.” During a
master course for business students, critical questions are answered with
statements like: “[Scientist N1] is going to publish about that in a few
weeks. I don’t know this by heart,” “I will ask [scientist N1] what we will
like to share with you,” or simply with: “I am not a scientist” (N2).
In other words, Neuro-X’s marketer delivers a simple story about emo-
tions being high or low and on and off, and she makes it reliable by
referring to fMRI machines that cannot make human mistakes4 and
hard-core scientists who make use of internationally published facts. That
is, technologies such as brain scanners, emotion graphs, and representa-
tive scientists function as witnesses in her neuromarketing account, and
for some of these witnesses, it is especially important that they are absent.
The absence of “hard-core” scientists (direct witnesses) allows the mar-
keter (a virtual witness) to avoid answering difficult questions, to not
reveal the complexity behind fMRI data, and to present the idea of adjus-
table emotions (virtual information) to students and potential clients (a
witnessing public)—all in the name of neuroscience. In other words,
making practices not amenable to scrutiny renders them unaccountable
to a witnessing public.
Neuromarketing in Practice
The marketers of Neuro-X specialize in evoking interest in potential clients
by referring to important scientists, internationally published facts, the
expertise of the machine and simplified brain knowledge. But after clients
have decided to cooperate with Neuro-X, their main point of contact is with
one of the researchers. Depending on the client’s specific question, the
researcher fashions a research proposal—sometimes in cooperation with
one of the scientists. The researcher then designs the experiment, collects
the materials needed, and prepares the input (movies, pictures, etc.) for the
scanner.
The experiment itself is carried out by two other people, often students:
an assistant of Neuro-X and a scan operator of the scanning center. The scan
operator is responsible for the fMRI scans, the assistant of Neuro-X for the
visual presentation in the experiment. The assistant explains the experiment
to the test subject, makes sure all the necessary forms (medical, informed
consent) are completed, and presents the right material at the right moments
during the scanning. The operator makes sure that the test subject enters the
scanner correctly (no metal, enough pillows, ear plugs), understands what is
expected (don’t move, pay attention) and what is allowed (push the alarm
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button when you get claustrophobic or have to go to the toilet), and watches
the scans and other devices (eye tracker, heartbeat, and respiratory moni-
tor). The operators have to motivate the test subject and make sure that he or
she understands the tasks and does not move or fall asleep. That is, they
have to make sure that the test-person follows the experimental “script”
(Roepstorff and Frith 2004) to ensure that he or she produces the right
results. In the words of one of the researchers: “When someone does not
understand what he or she should do, or is not focused on the task or the
images, the experiment will fail” (N5).
The next step of the study is conducted mainly behind the scenes. The
scan results of around twenty-four test persons are sent to one of the scien-
tists who analyses the data. This analyzing process is extremely fast—by
contrast with the rather slow process of academic fMRI research in which it
can take up to forty hours even to make one scan analyzable, according to a
PhD student of consumer neuroscience. Researchers at Neuro-X receive the
results back in a few days, in the form of scores on positive and negative
states such as trust, attention, or anger. One of the researchers explains:
“[We get] results within two days. [Scientist N3]) just has some scripts in
SPSS for that” (N5). The scientists confirm this. They describe the complete
process as “an automatic pipeline” and the analysis of the fMRI data as
working with “scripts” that “automatically generate reports” (N4). The
professor of neuroscience explains:
We have identified these networks and we don’t tinker with them anymore.
We really defined a pipeline, a priori. And that is nice because otherwise it
would just take too much time, also because we can now say: this commercial
gives this result. ( . . . ) So actually it is very much automatized and standar-
dized. (N1)
This routinized process is the crux of what happens in the company. The
automatically generated reports do not themselves contain fMRI data but
instead provide scores on positive and negative states or emotions. The
researchers receive these scores in the form of a web diagram, in which
the scores of “ineffective commercials” and “effective commercials” are
also visualized. They then need only to interpret these emotion scores in
terms of the customers’ questions, make a report, and present the—very
clear—results to the customer.
So we see that one of the key strategies of Neuro-X is to divide the tasks
and responsibilities in the company. The marketers disseminate the simple
neurostory to a wide public of potential virtual witnesses (or clients). To
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keep this public interested, they give a voice to important scientists, impec-
cable machines, pushable brain buttons, and high- or low-level emotions,
and they keep silent about fMRI data, moving test subjects, scripts in SPSS,
and a priori–defined networks. The researchers give a voice to the clients in
the sense—and during the time—that they negotiate about their specific
questions and problems. They collect and prepare the materials of the
clients for the scanner, and they bring the results in understandable figures
and numbers. The experiment operatives give a voice to the test subjects
while preparing them for the scanner (they are allowed to ask questions) but
also make sure that they are silent during the experiment. And the analytical
scientists give a voice to the brain by translating brain data into emotion
networks, and their automatic pipeline makes sure that all complex details
and processes are backgrounded. So all parties give a voice to some wit-
nesses, while keeping others silenced. Together, they produce one very
persuasive visual representation—a spidergram of emotions that everyone
understands.
The Silence of Neuro-X
In this spidergram, clients see at a glance what scores their products/cam-
paigns receive, and they can compare this with previous campaigns that
were considered likable, annoying, or effective. However, finding out
exactly how these diagrams are constructed is not so straightforward. We
interviewed scientists, marketers, and experimenters; sent many questions
by e-mail; observed during experiments; and attended several lectures in
which the company presented their results, and Neuro-X was very coopera-
tive. Yet, always at some point, we ran into a wall of secrecy. The professor,
for example, explains:
We show stimuli of which we assume that everyone finds these pleasant or
unpleasant and then we extract these networks in the brain that represent these
positive or negative emotions. ( . . . ) And, yes, what these emotions exactly
are, and what kind of networks, and especially what the relation is between
these emotions and these networks, and finally human behavior, if they will
buy something or not, or if a commercial is effective or not—yes, we keep
that for ourselves. (N1)
However, it was not always clear exactly which part of the business was
secret. When we asked the company’s marketer about this, she answered:
“The amount of exposures, the analyses that are built on algorithms, the
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filters we use” (N2). One of the scientific analysts told us that she has
written a standard manual about what to offer, the amount of stimuli, and
so on. But when we asked whether we could have a look at this manual, she
firmly answered “no” (N3). We were allowed to observe experiments (and
hence could count stimuli), but we were asked to leave the room at the
moment they have to “plan the scans.” When we asked the researchers some
questions by e-mail, they happily answered—even showed some results—
but also added that they hope we treat their answers confidentially. One of
the researchers told us that the company has applied for some patents but
does not want to mention for what. When we asked the marketer about such
patents, she explained: “We have patented a few things—some small parts.
But when you patent everything, you also have to open up everything. Just
imagine, there could be a Chinese professor [N1] who has this 15 minutes
later” (N2).
That is to say, opening up the black box of neuromarketing is not so easy.
Those explanations we are given are backed up by a variety of tools in the
form of brain scans, emotion networks, important scientists, internationally
published facts, and machines that avoid human mistakes and hide a com-
mitment to silence about the methods. Direct witnesses (the operators,
researchers, analysts, and test subjects) of the experiments in Neuro-X are
only occasionally allowed a voice. And since all methods, procedures, and
handouts are secret, Neuro-X does not seem to produce any virtual wit-
nesses either, in the sense of observers of the procedures and results in
scientific articles or manuals (Shapin and Schaffer 1985). This raises the
question: how does Neuro-X produce a witnessing public?
The Credibility of Neuro-X
Neuro-X isn’t the only marketing company that hides its methods from
outsiders: it is not unusual in business to keep your research methods or
marketing strategies secret. However, neuromarketers make claims not only
about marketing but also about neuroscience, and it is especially their uses
of neuroscientific explanations and tools that give their companies a certain
status. So we might expect their academic—the consumer neuroscientists
who publish their methods and results as part of academic peer-reviewed
publication processes—to be the obvious virtual witnesses of companies
like Neuro-X. These consumer neuroscientists also circumvent the human
voice and instead search for the correlation between neural activity and
consumer behavior. Since they know how to reproduce the experiments
and verify the methods and results of a neuromarketing company, they
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could be reliable and powerful allies. However, our interviews with con-
sumer neuroscientists, and our attendance at courses and lectures in this
field, suggest that they are actually somewhat skeptical about the methods
and results of Neuro-X and other neuromarketing companies. They point
out that these companies do not publish (academically) or otherwise reveal
their methods, and so they are doubtful about the reliability of their com-
mercial colleagues. Moreover, some academics call for a program of
“evidence-based neuromarketing” (Smidts et al. 2014, 265). This skepti-
cism also comes to the fore in a master’s course on neuromarketing where
the professor in consumer neuroscience discusses a lecture by Neuro-X with
her students:
Yes, sometimes I also wonder; what do they know that we don’t? ( . . . ) You
don’t know how they measure a response. They link the brain to observation
but they never show how. You simply have to take their word for it. ( . . . ) But
maybe they have solved it. If they can distinguish these emotions they have
something.” (C1)
Comparable evaluations are expressed by some PhD students in consumer
neuroscience who argue, for example: “You simply don’t know if it is not
very much exaggerated” (C4), “Why don’t we find that and they do?”
(C4), or “You can’t control what they are doing because their methods are
secret” (C3).
In an interview, the professor expresses her doubts about the credibility
of the company: “We don’t know for sure [if their methods work]. They are
a bit loose with their p-values. They dare to show results with a p ¼ 0.20,
which means that one of every five answers is not based on anything, but
you don’t know which one. In my opinion, that is over-claiming” (C1). She
also brings in the position of the clients and actually gives them the role of
witnesses:
A client does not want to hear: “we don’t know if a is better than b,” so [they]
say: “a is better than b.” From a scientific point of view this is irresponsible,
but clients do accept it. [ . . .However . . . ] clients probably want to test dif-
ferent methods [at other companies], and finally they will have material to
compare. So we will see if this really has an added value for them. (C1)
In other words, since neuromarketing companies do not want to publish
their methods, consumer neuroscientists actually have little insight into
what these companies are doing. Consumer neuroscientists, with their
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academic expertise and knowledge, are silenced because they can only
guess what exactly happens in such companies. Yet this silencing of very
strong potential witnesses does not seem to harm these companies. Part of
this may be because potentially critical questions and comments like: “Why
don’t we find that?,” “Maybe they have solved it,” or “we will see if this
really has an added value for them [clients]” can also be understood as
expressing a certain curiosity on the part of consumer neuroscientists. Some
of them find ways of engaging with neuromarketers during conferences,
contacting them directly by e-mail or enter into collaborations. These
exchanges, engagements, or entanglements have the potential to create
additional witnesses. However, it is likely that these witnesses are silenced
by nondisclosure agreements or encounter walls of secrecy similar to the
silences we encountered in our ethnographic research. Despite academic
collaborators being silenced (or encountering silences), we wonder whether
there is a sense in which we ourselves count as witnesses since we have seen
(some) of the doing of neuromarketing as presented in this paper. Perhaps
our own effort at studying neuromarketing practices inevitably co-
constitutes them. At the same time, our attempts to maintain anonymity
further add to the silences of neuromarketing. So the direct witnesses of
neuromarketing may still bear a certain potential for producing credibility
despite acknowledging silences, limited access, and unresolved questions,
if they bring a certain academic or organizational credibility to the colla-
boration in the first place.5
Case Studies as Evidence
The results of neuromarketing companies cannot be (scientifically) vali-
dated but can only be evaluated by clients. However, making contact with
neuromarketing clients is hindered by privacy considerations. Although
some neuromarketing consultancies put case studies or brand names (e.g.,
Coca-Cola, McDonalds, Unilever, BBC, GlaxoSmithKline) on their web-
sites, occasionally mention them to journalists, at industry conferences, or
in their (trade press) publications, they maintain their clients’ anonymity.
Despite such privacy and secrecy rules, we managed to retrieve some
(fMRI) case studies of neuromarketing clients of Neuro-X or other fMRI
marketing studies. At a meeting for executives of different companies
where Neuro-X was asked to give a guest lecture (and we were invited to
join), we talked to an executive of a bank who told us that they had once
hired a neuromarketing company to use fMRI to test whether their reputa-
tion was damaged and whether they should change their logo or their
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advertisement. The fMRI research demonstrated that their reputation was
not too much damaged and that a new campaign would not be very helpful.
This was valuable information for the bank because otherwise they would
have spent a lot of money to set up a new campaign.
In a competition for a media communication award, Neuro-X presented a
case study to the audience (of which we were part) together with one of their
clients: a public broadcaster of radio and television commercials. The pub-
lic broadcaster wanted to prove its added value above commercial broad-
casting companies. They had not achieved the desired answers with
traditional research. The fMRI research, however, did prove their added
value, and hence they use the fMRI results to promote the idea that com-
mercials in between programs are more effective than commercials that
interrupt programs—as a sort of advertisement for their own company. In
an annual report, they write that “Unique brain research of [the broadcast
company] and [Neuro-X] proves that the many years of contact with the
quality programs of the national channels, resulted in a consequent positive
impact on commercials broadcasted in this public environment.”
In another example, a creative agency and Neuro-X worked closely
together on a popular car commercial. The commercial is partly filmed in
a neuroimaging center, and the professor of neuroscience (N1) figures as a
scientist conducting fMRI scans. We see (raw) fMRI scans, the eye of the
(assumed) test-person, and a driving car. We hear the sounds of the car, and
a voice-over concludes: “Your brain expects the same satisfaction from
[this car] as it does from addictive things.”
So, while most clients of neuromarketing companies are a well-kept
secret—neuromarketing companies are not allowed to reveal their names,
and this problem of secrecy is also much discussed at neuromarketing
conferences—other clients use the (positive) results of neuromarketing
companies to promote their own brand or company. In this case, neuromar-
keting clients can turn into very strong witnesses. Not only because they
represent one of the rare case studies, but also because they actively dis-
seminate this success story in their own networks, for example, to prove that
they are “really” better than their competitors.
That is to say, when clients of neuromarketing companies become sali-
ent, they are often in an interactive relationship with the company: the brand
and the neuromarketing company reinforce each other (see also Andrejevic
2012). In this interaction, however, the “neuro” part of neuromarketing is
not always completely clear. Although the brain is sometimes brought up as
evidence for a claim (in the form “brain research proves . . . ”), it is espe-
cially the practical results in terms of clients, money, and reputation that are
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brought to the fore. That is, the brain is present but its role is not fully
explained. It has become backgrounded, but nevertheless, figures as a very
strongwitness that can testify formany sorts of evidence. This phenomenon—
simply referring to the brain makes a statement appear more real, objective, or
effective in the eyes of the public—has become known as “neurorealism”
among (critical/social) neuroscientists (Illes et al. 2010; O’Connor, Rees, and
Joffe 2012; Racine, Bar-Ilan, and Illes 2005). In the world of neuromarketing,
this mechanism is very obvious. In many lectures, books, and blogs, the brain
simply substitutes for the consumer or seems not to add any relevant informa-
tion at all (e.g., “why brains buy”; Pradeep 2010 cited in Andrejevic 2012).
And in some cases, such as the broadcasting company and the car manufac-
turer, this effect is so strong that the brain is used as a marketing tool—a
witness that “proves” that you are better than your competitor.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have questioned how it is possible that neuromarketing
companies produce a witnessing public in the form of clients and media
attention, while the actual experiments all occur behind the scenes and are
not, or not completely, published. We argue that the described silences help
to sustain neuromarketing’s promises. Consumer neuroscientists are unable
to verify the analysis of neuromarketing companies because of their
secrecy. Clients do not understand the methods of these companies and,
moreover, they cannot be approached because of their anonymity. Hence,
the only knowledge we can retrieve is based on what neuromarketers decide
to share. Neuromarketing companies decide which witnesses are allowed to
speak and which actors should be silenced. For instance, consumers (who
figure as research subjects) in neuromarketing research practice are denied
a voice in the form of a self-report on their consumption preferences. The
consumers’ brain is “interviewed,” measured, rendered visible, and ana-
lyzed instead. Marketers and researchers talk on behalf of neuroscientists
about positive and negative emotions but are silent about the uncertainties
or difficulties of fMRI research. Neuroscientists can talk about fMRI data,
computer scripts, and statistical tests, but the ins and outs of their methods
and automatic pipelines are corporate secrets. Research operatives talk with
the subjects and make sure they behave during the scan as silent, motion-
less, but attentive brains. Clients are silent because of anonymity—until the
moment that they decide to speak up which is basically when they can use
neuromarketing to advance their own marketing strategies.
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Rather than considering this secrecy as a barrier to understanding neu-
romarketing in the making, we follow Rappert’s (2010) advice on high-
lighting secrets. In our account of neuromarketing, we examine the effects
of secrets—in particular the silence of direct witnesses in the case of Neuro-
X. Returning to Woolgar and Coopmans (2006) helps to understand why
these absences of (speaking) witnesses appear to have a positive effect on
the field of neuromarketing. In their attempt to understand the connections
between the deployment and the subsequent success of a technology, Wool-
gar and Coopmans concluded there is not only a distinction between the
actual experiment and its virtual information (e.g., in publications) but also
between what is understood as actual and virtual information. Applying this
to the case of neuromarketing, we conclude that since the direct witnesses in
a neuromarketing experiment are silenced, there is no actual information to
be verified. Hence, it is not the transformation from consumers’ preferences
to brain responses that is understood as the transit from real to virtual; nor
the translation from raw brain data into visualized emotion networks; nor
the transfer from emotion networks to advertising strategies. If neuromar-
keting solely relies on the approval of clients, the “actual” experiment is
whether the neuromarketing advice corresponds to what these clients expect
or want. In other words, the executive of the bank receives the message that
the reputation of the bank is not damaged too much and is satisfied because
it gives a “validated” reason not to start a new campaign. The broadcasting
company is happy because the outcomes of the neuromarketing study per-
fectly fit their marketing strategy. And the creatives of the car commercial
used neuromarketing and the brain as witnesses to prove the success of the
car. These clients give credibility to neuromarketing, while in none of these
cases is the efficacy of neuromarketing proved or disproved. Clients take
the results, are happy with these or not, but they will never find out what
would have happened if the study would have given a different outcome.
Our case study demonstrates that silence can help produce credibility
when it allows virtual witnesses to speak on behalf of direct witnesses, and
hence, that silence and secrecy can produce virtual information that is no
longer based upon the actual experiment but on what clients expect or want.
Drawing on these findings, we conclude by proposing three themes that we
consider central for STS researchers studying newly emerging research
fields and practices that straddle science and its commercial application.
First, we surmise that comparative studies of different groups and group
identities (as in our case the neuromarketers vs. consumer neuroscientists)
in newly emerging research fields will allow for an initial identification of
tensions in managing science and its application beyond academic basic
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research. Second, we suggest that STS scholars attend to the performative
effects of silence particularly in “nontraditional” or “hybrid” research set-
tings such as commercial research laboratories. This enables further ela-
boration both of the effects of secrets in the business context (and the
potential these have for making new markets) and of the likely negative
effects (e.g., public distrust) these could have on the underlying area of
scientific study. This is particularly important at a time when calls for
research impact and the commercialization of science are redefining
“scientific life” (Shapin 2008) and compelling scientists to demonstrate
their research’s business potential and when the public’s distrust of science
is increasing. Third, we propose that in trying to understand collaboration
among different members of commercial research laboratories (and advi-
sors, external collaborators, etc.), greater emphasis should be given to the in
situ study of how silences are generated and maintained and how they are
not turned into an issue in collaboration. Our understanding of this silence
about silences (the elephant in the room), what we might call the achieve-
ment of “nonissuefication,” could usefully supplement and extend existing
STS research on “trading zones”6 (Galison 1997) by studying how colla-
boration can be achieved despite not finding a common scientific language.
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Notes
1. The seventeen topics were relation neuromarketing-academia, brain manipula-
tion, technologies, professionalism-amateurism, advertising as science or art,
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human-machine, objectifying the subject, creating the human brain with func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging, money, secrecy of methods, effectiveness,
backgrounds of neuromarketers, tacit knowledge, neuro versus marketing, pro-
cess from idea to publication, men-women, and trends and developments.
2. Acronyms stand for: N¼Neuro-X, C¼ consumer neuroscientist. Numbers stand
for the sequence of the interviewees in this group.
3. This is a quote from the Internet. To keep the company anonymous, we do not
cite the exact link.
4. This is a questionable claim. See, for example, Vul et al. (2009), Stelzer et al.
(2014).
5. This issue of reflexivity was also addressed in one of our previous papers
(Schneider and Woolgar 2015).
6. Galison (1997) uses the concept of the “trading zone” to explain how engineers
and physicists with different backgrounds/paradigms managed to collaborate and
to develop particle detectors and radar.
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